

Message Text

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S/S - MR. MOFFAT

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY PRIORITY

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FOR SONNENFELDT

FOLLOWING SENT ACTION SECSTATE WASHDC INFO BONN BRUSSELS
CAIRO CANBERRA THE HAGUE LONDON LAGOS MANILA MEXICO MOSCOW
OTTAWA ROME SEOUL STOCKHOLM TOKYO USUN NEW YORK USMISSION
NATO IAEA VIENNA ERDA GERMANTOWN MD FROM GENEVA 19 MAY 75:

QUOTE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE GENEVA 3654

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: NPT REVCON: COMMITTEE I SITUATION

1. SUMMARY: THIS MESSAGE REPORTS ON STATE OF PLAY ON
THREE COMMITTEE I ISSUES LIKELY TO GIVE US MOST
DIFFICULTIES IN LAST TWO WEEKS OF CONFERENCE: SALT,
NON-USE ASSURANCES, AND CTB. END SUMMARY.

2. FIRST COMMITTEE ITEMS. AMONG ISSUES CONSIDERED IN
COMMITTEE I, WE CAN EXPECT MOST DIFFICULTY IN ACHIEVING
ACCEPTABLE CONFERENCE CONSENSUS ON QUESTIONS OF FOLLOW-
ON SALT NEGOTIATIONS, COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN (CTB), AND
SECURITY ASSURANCES. DRAFT ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS HAVE
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NOW BEEN TABLED ON EACH OF THESE QUESTIONS, BUT PROTOCOLS
THEMSELVES IN PRESENT FORM NOT LIKELY TO BE MAJOR PROBLEM.
THERE IS RECOGNITION AMONG WESTERN, EASTERN, AND NUMBER
OF NON-ALIGNED DELS THAT MATHEMATICAL FORMULAS IN SALT

AND CTB PROTOCOLS ARE NOT REALISTIC MEANS OF ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES OF PROTOCOLS' CO-SPONSORS. ALSO, PROTOCOLS ARE ONLY OPEN TO ADHERENCE BY THREE DEPOSITARIES (SALT OPEN ONLY TO US AND USSR), AND THERE SEEMS TO BE GROWING UNDERSTANDING, EVEN AMONG SOME NON-ALIGNED, THAT PRESSING PROTOCOLS AGAINST WILL OF ALL THOSE ELIGIBLE TO ADHERE WOULD BE EMPTY GESTURE AND PERHAPS COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. IF CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATIONS URGING ADHERENCE TO PROTOCOLS WERE PUT TO VOTE (WITH TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY REQUIRED IF CONSENSUS NOT ACHIEVABLE) WE COULD PROBABLY MUSTER BLOCKING ONE-THIRD.

3. IT APPEARS MORE LIKELY, HOWEVER, THAT RATHER THAN PRESS CURRENT TEXTS TO A VOTE, CO-SPONSORS (PARTICULARLY OF SALT AND CTB PROTOCOLS) WILL ALTER SUBSTANTIVE APPROACH (MOVING AWAY FROM MATHEMATICAL FORMULAS), EITHER RETAINING PROTOCOL FORMAT OR PUTTING RECOMMENDATIONS INFORM OF RESOLUTIONS OR PARAGRAPHS IN FINAL DECLARATION. SHOULD THEY DO SO, WE WOULD STILL EXPECT PROPOSALS TO BE UNACCEPTABLE (PERHAPS INVOLVING CONDEMNATIONS OF SUPERPOWER FOOT-DRAGGING, DEADLINES, TIMETABLES, ETC); BUT IF ALTERED PROPOSALS GOT RID OF PATENTLY UNREALISTIC FEATURES OF PRESENT PROTOCOLS, WE COULD HAVE CONSIDERABLY MORE DIFFICULTY DEFEATING THEM. PROBLEMS ON SALT AND CTB WILL COME NOT JUST FROM NON-ALIGNED, BUT ALSO IN VARYING DEGREES FROM SEVERAL MEMBERS OF WEO GROUP, INCLUDING AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, IRELAND, CANADA, AND THE NETHERLANDS. PARAS 4 - 12 BELOW DEAL SEPARATELY WITH SALT, NON-USE AND CTB.

4. SALT. VIRTUALLY ALL NON-ALIGNED DELS AND SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF WEOS HAVE MINIMIZED SALT ACHIEVEMENTS, CRITICIZED RATE OF PROGRESS, AND CALLED FOR RAPID REDUCTIONS IN VLADIVOSTOK LEVELS. MANY HAVE SAID FOLLOW-ON AGREEMENTS SHOULD INVOLVE QUALITATIVE CURBS AS WELL AS REDUCTIONS IN NUMERICAL CEILINGS. WHILE SYMPATHY NOT GREAT FOR MECHANISTIC MEXICAN APPROACH TO LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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REDUCTIONS SCHEDULE, SEVERAL DELS STILL WANT SOME SORT OF TIMETABLE. SWEDISH VIEW -- REJECTING "ARTIFICIAL" TIMETABLE BUT CALLING ON SUPERPOWERS TO PROVIDE "REALISTIC" ONE -- IS PERHAPS TYPICAL OF MODERATE NON-ALIGNED THINKING.

5. AUSTRALIANS, DUTCH, AND OTHERS HAVE WELCOMED US STATEMENT IN COMMITTEE I THAT WE LOOK FORWARD TO COMMENCEMENT OF FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE FOLLOWING CONCLUSION OF SALT II AGREEMENT, ON FURTHER LIMITATIONS AND REDUCTIONS. SOVIETS HAVE MADE NO MENTION OF FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS OR POSSIBILITY OF

REDUCTIONS AND, AS A RESULT, SEVERAL DELS HAVE PUBLICLY URGED SOVS TO MAKE STATEMENT SIMILAR TO THAT OF US. SOVDEL TOLD US PRIVATELY THEY ARE SEEKING INSTRUCTIONS TO TAKE POSITION SIMILAR TO OURS.

6 WHILE SOV POSITION HAS FOR TIME BEING KEPT HEAT OFF US, WE EXPECT PRESSURES FROM SOME WEOS AS WELL AS NON-ALIGNED TO GO BEYOND LINE WE HAVE TAKEN, PARTICULARLY IF SOVIET DEL IS AUTHORIZED TO BE LESS RIGID. SPECIFICALLY, WE ANTICIPATE BEING PRESSED FOR COMMITMENT ON RATE OF REDUCTIONS, BUT FEEL THAT MODERATE DELS (E.G., AUSTRALIA, NETHERLANDS, CANADA) WOULD ULTIMATELY BE SATISFIED WITHOUT SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS ON DATES OR LEVELS AS LONG AS WE COULD STRENGTHEN FORMULATION IN GENERAL WAY. AMONG SMALL MODIFICATIONS IN CURRENTLY AUTHORIZED FORMULA THAT MIGHT BE USEFUL IN OBTAINING ELEVENTH-HOUR CONSENSUS ARE (A) LANGUAGE RECOGNIZING THAT "FURTHER LIMITATIONS" SHOULD INCLUDE QUALITATIVE AS WELL AS QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS (AS IN "BASIC PRINCIPLES" OF 1973 AND 1974 MOSCOW COMMUNIQUE, (B) LANGUAGE TO EFFECT THAT GOAL IS "SUBSTANTIAL" OR "SIGNIFICANT" REDUCTIONS, AND/OR (C) LANGUAGE EXPRESSING HOPE THAT FURTHER LIMITATIONS AND REDUCTIONS CAN BE ACHIEVED "AS SOON AS POSSIBLE". WE WILL, OF COURSE, CONTINUE TO ADHERE TO EXISTING FORMULA AND WILL REQUEST ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE ONLY WHEN AND IF IT BECOMES NECESSARY.

7 SECURITY ASSURANCES. TWO PROPOSALS ON SECURITY ASSURANCES ARE CURRENTLY IN PLAY: NON-ALIGNED LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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(ROMANIAN) DRAFT ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL III (GENEVA 3618) AND IRANIAN DRAFT RESOLUTION ON NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES, CIRCULATING PRIVATELY, WHICH CALLS ON NUCLEAR POWERS TO UNDERTAKE COMMITMENT NOT TO USE OR THREATEN TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST PARTIES TO NFZS. (IRANIAN DEL HAS SHOWED US, BUT NOT HANDED OVER, COPY OF RES). NON-ALIGNED STRONGLY SUPPORT NON-USE COMMITMENT APPLICABLE WORLDWIDE, SUCH AS THAT IN ROMANIAN FORMULA. WEOS, WITH EXCEPTION OF SWEDEN, HAVE GENERALLY TAKEN VIEW THAT IT IS APPROPRIATE TO CONSIDER NON-USE ASSURANCES ONLY IN CONTEXT OF NUCLEAR FREE ZONES. SINCE ROMANIAN FORMULATION INCONCISTENT WITH NATO STRATEGY, WE PRESUME NATO ALLIES ARE OPPOSED, ALTHOUGH IT IS NOT YET CLEAR WHETHER THEY ARE PREPARED TO TAKE STRONG NEGATIVE STAND IN PUBLIC.

8. WHILE SOVIETS HAVE HELD THAT EXISTING ASSURANCES (SC 255) ARE ADEQUATE, THEY HAVE NOT SO FAR EXPRESSED OPPOSITION TO NON-USE ASSURANCES. WE THEREFORE DO NOT KNOW THEIR REACTION TO ROMANIAN PROPOSAL, WHICH HAS

ONE ELEMENT IN COMMON WITH "KOSYGIN FORMULA" OF 1966 (I.E., DISTINCTION BETWEEN NNWS WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON THEIR TERRITORY AND THOSE WITHOUT). JAPANESE ARE SITTING BACK, WAITING FOR OPPORTUNE TIME TO SURFACE THEIR PROPOSAL ON NEGATIVE ASSURANCES.

9. IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR INSTRUCTIONS, WE HAVE OPPOSED GENERALIZED NON-USE COMMITMENTS TO NNWS, MAINTAINING THAT SUCH ASSURANCES COULD UNDERCUT SECURITY OF ALLIED STATES AND QUESTIONING WHETHER SUCH ASSURANCES WOULD BE PRACTICAL AND EFFECTIVE MEANS OF ALLEVIATING REAL SECURITY CONCERNS OF KEY NNWS TO WHICH ASSURANCES LARGELY ADDRESSED. ON NON-USE ASSURANCES IN NFZ CONTEXT, WE HAVE STRESSED NEED IN EACH CASE TO DETERMINE WHETHER, GIVEN PREVAILING SECURITY SITUATION IN REGION, PROVISION OF NON-USE ASSURANCES WOULD MAKE POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION TO SECURITY OF AREA.

10. WE TOLD IRANIAN DEL THAT WE COULD NOT AGREE TO BLANK-CHECK COMMITMENT NOT TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST PARTIES TO ANY FUTURE NFZ. IRANIAN DEL NONE-LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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THELESS DECIDED TO CIRCULATE TEXT IN ORIGINAL FORM. AUSTRALIANS HAD TRIED UNSUCCESSFULLY TO PERSUADE IRANIANS TO USE FOLLOWING LANGUAGE IN DRAFT: "IN ASSOCIATION WITH THE CREATION OF SUCH INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONES IN APPROPRIATE REGIONS OF THE WORLD, THE NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES SHOULD GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO ENTERING INTO COMMITMENTS NOT TO USE OR THREATEN TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST STATES BELONGING TO SUCH ZONES." SOMETHING ALONG LINES OF AUSTRALIAN FORMULATION COULD POSSIBLY HEAD OFF MORE EXTREME IRANIAN PROPOSAL. WE WILL REQUEST AUTHORITY TO SUPPORT SPECIFIC COMPROMISE FORMULA WHEN AND IF NEEDED.

11. IT IS DIFFICULT TO PREDICT AT PRESENT TIME WHETHER CONSENSUS CAN BE ACHIEVED ON BASIS OF JAPANESE NEGATIVE ASSURANCE PROPOSAL IN LIEU OF ROMANIAN DRAFT PROTOCOL. WE EXPECT WE WILL HAVE TO SEEK AUTHORITY AT LATER STAGE TO SUPPORT LANGUAGE ALONG LINES OF JAPANESE FORMULATION OR MORE GENERAL CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATION TO CONSIDER PRACTICAL MEANS OF STRENGTHENING NNWS SECURITY

12. COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN. CTB IS HANGING UP AS MOST DIFFICULT COMMITTEE ISSUE. ALTHOUGH MEXICAN PROTOCOL HAS LITTLE SUPPORT, WE NEVERTHELESS CAN UNDOUBTEDLY EXPECT PERSISTENT ATTEMPTS TO GET US TO ADVANCE OUR POSITION BY ACCEPTING STRONG CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATION

IN FORM OF RESOLUTION OR FINAL DECLARATION. SUCH A RECOMMENDATION MIGHT, FOR EXAMPLE, CALL FOR A SPECIFIC DEADLINE OR TIMETABLE FOR CONCLUSION OF CTB (AS SOME DELS HAVE SUGGESTED). UNLIKE SALT (WHERE SOVIET BLOCK AND MANY WEOS WILL STAND WITH US) OR NON-USE (WHERE WE HAVE AT LEAST TACIT SUPPORT OF NATO), SUPPORT FOR OUR POSITION ON TEST BAN IS HIGHLY UNCERTAIN FACTOR. AUSTRALIANS, NEW ZEALANDERS, CANADIANS, AND DUTCH HAVE ALREADY INDICATED THEY WANT CONFERENCE TO GIVE STRONG PUSH TO CTB, AND THAT THEY BELIEVE PRESENT FORMULA IN WEO TEXT (WHICH THEY ACQUIESCED IN FOR PRESENT PURPOSES TO KEEP US ABOARD) IS TOO WEAK. WE CAN EXPECT THESE DELS TO SUPPORT NON-ALIGNED PRESSURE FOR STRONGER LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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FORMULA AS NEGOTIATIONS WITH NON-ALIGNED PROCEED FURTHER. SOVIET BLOC COULD CONCEIVABLY GO ALONG WITH TOUGH RECOMMENDATION IF IT WERE CONSISTENT WITH POSITIONS THEY HAVE TAKEN IN PAST. THERE IS REAL RISK THEREFORE, THAT, IF VOTE TAKEN ON SUCH A RECOMMENDATION, WE WOULD NOT GET SUPPORT OF ONE-THIRD NEEDED TO BLOCK ADOPTION OF RECOMMENDATION. WE WILL SEEK GUIDANCE ON POSSIBLE COMPROMISE FORMULAS WHEN SITUATION CLARIFIES. DALE UNQUOTE INGERSOLL

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